Ethnic Diversity, Public Spending and Political Regimes by Ghosh, Sugata & Mitra, Anirban
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Ethnic Diversity, Public Spending and
Political Regimes
Sugata Ghosh and Anirban Mitra
2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75546/
MPRA Paper No. 75546, posted 13 December 2016 15:47 UTC
Ethnic Diversity, Public Spending and Political Regimes
By Sugata Ghosh and Anirban Mitra1
November 2016
Abstract
We study the relationship between ethnic diversity and public spending under two different
political regimes, namely, democracy and dictatorship. We build a theory where political
leaders (democratically elected or not) decide on the allocation of spending on different types
of public goods: a general public good and an ethnically-targetable public good. We show
that the relationship between public spending and ethnic diversity is qualitatively different
under the two regimes. In particular, higher ethnic diversity leads to greater investment
in general rather than group-specific public goods under democracy; the opposite relation
obtains under dictatorship. We also discuss some implications of our results for economic
performance and citizen’s welfare.
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1 Introduction
The role of political institutions in determining various economic outcomes has received
much attention in the recent years.2 A considerable literature deals with the question of how
democracy – viewed as an institutional setting – affects economic performance. Some scholars
argue that democracy is beneficial for growth (see e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2014)) while others
posit that the effect is conditioned by several other socio-political factors which may render
it indeterminate or even detrimental (see e.g., Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), Kaplan (2000)).
In a related vein, it is widely believed that ethnic diversity has an impact on a multitude
of economic outcomes, including public spending, in a polity. Several scholars argue that
the effect of diversity is adverse or at least non-beneficial to the provision of public goods
and growth in general (see e.g., Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (1999), Miguel
and Gugerty (2005), Baldwin and Huber (2010)); others have taken a different position (see
Fearon and Laitin (1996), Fearon (2003)).
In this paper, we study the inter-play of these two broad linkages: (i) between institu-
tional framework (democracy/dictatorship) and economic outcomes and (ii) between ethnic
diversity and economic outcomes. We recognize that the systematic differences between
democracies and dictatorships have the potential to affect the nature of public good pro-
vision for any given level of ethnic diversity. Moreover, the pattern of provision may be
different for varying levels of ethnic diversity; and this potentially varies by political regimes
(democracy/dictatorship). To the extent public spending has the potential to affect eco-
nomic outcomes, this would bear implications for the relation between political institutions
and economic performance for varying levels of ethnic diversity.
We develop a theoretical model which addresses such issues by considering two alternative
political regimes: democracy and dictatorship.3 Irrespective of the political regime, it is
widely accepted that one of the main purposes of government spending is to finance public
goods. Public goods have an important role to play in the economy, particularly in boosting
output and economic growth, as is demonstrated by the glut of literature on endogenous
growth.4 Political parties within a democracy would understandably be interested in spend-
ing on such goods, as their terms in office would depend quite importantly on this spending.
For dictators, who are not elected through popular mandate, there is an alternative incen-
tive to direct public spending in a certain way: they would typically embezzle a portion for
themselves, while also ensuring that they minimise the chances of a popular uprising. In this
paper, we argue that ethnic diversity makes an impact on the spending on public goods and
this impact varies significantly by political regime. Additionally, this difference in public
2Persson (2002) contains an excellent overview.
3There is a significant literature which studies regime changes, and it is true that the economic climate
in a country could affect the transition from a non-democracy to a democracy, and vice versa. However, we
abstract from those considerations.
4See, for instance, Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993), Turnovsky (1997), Ghosh and Roy (2004), etc.
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goods provision potentially translates into difference in economic performance.
In our model, there is a dominant ethnic group and an amalgamation of many other (mi-
nority) groups. Two public goods are produced in this society, both of which contribute to
output – one, a “general” public good which benefits everyone irrespective of their ethnic
background, while the other, an “ethnic” public good, benefits only the dominant ethnic
group. We first study a democratic setup with two parties which compete for the citizens’
votes by each promising budgetary allocations on the two public goods. Here we show that
the equilibrium allocation involves a monotonic relationship between ethnic diversity and
the share of the general public good. Above a certain threshold level of ethnic diversity,
the entire budget is spent on the general public good by either political party; below this
threshold, the spending is enirely on the ethnic public good. This is intuitive, as in the
absence of a “large” dominant group, political parties will strive to compete for votes from
all sections of the population (and hence invest in the general public good), while in the
presence of such a group, the parties would spend much of their energies in catering to that
group (thereby investing in the ethnic good).
In the case of a dictatorial regime, there is no explicit role for political parties. The dictator
decides on the allocation of public spending with largely two considerations in mind: appro-
priation of the public funds (“rents”) and surviving any potential uprising by the citizens.
In the eventuality of a successful revolt, there is a return to the two-party democratic regime
and the dictator is disallowed from appropriating any amount of the public budget. Thus,
the dictator has to factor in how the different ethnic groups will react – i.e., support a re-
bellion or not – when he makes his public spending allocation. Clearly, the decision by any
citizen would depend upon what she thinks the alternative scenario (in this case, democracy)
will deliver to her. What makes the issue perhaps more interesting is that what democracy
delivers depends upon how ethnically diverse the society is. So our subgame perfect equilibria
in the dictatorship game depend upon the level of ethnic diversity.
We show that when ethnic diversity is higher than a certain threshold, the dictator only
spends on providing the ethnic public good.5 Also, when ethnic diversity is lower than
that threshold, the dictator invests only in the general public good. In other words, a very
ethnically diverse society will have spending on the ethnic good and none on the general
good. It is precisely an ethnically homogeneous society (one with a large dominant ethnic
group) which will witness spending on the general public good and none on the ethnic good.
Observe that this is completely contrary to the pattern of public spending under democracy.
The intuition for this result is the following: with high diversity, the minority group has an
incentive to rebel since they know that they will get to enjoy the general public good in case
the dictator is ousted and elections take place. In order to prevent members of the dominant
group from joining the rebellion, more of the ethnic good has to be offered to that group
by the dictator. Conversely, with low ethnic diversity, the dominant group has an incentive
5This threshold is the same as the one where the switch in spending happens under democracy.
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to rebel since under democracy the entire budget will be spent on their ethnic good. In
this situation the minority group will not rebel since democracy will not bring them any
enjoyment of the general public good. In order to dissuade some members of the majority
from rebelling, a positive amount of the general public good will be offered by the dictator.
Provision of the ethnic good is not optimal since under democracy the entire budget would
be spent on it. So providing the ethnic good would only prevent rebellion if the dictator
did not appropriate any positive share of the budget. But clearly, that is sub-optimal from
the dictator’s perspective. Hence the dictator tries to dissuade rebellion by providing the
general public good.
As a result of this, the pattern of expenditure on public goods – in particular, the manner it
varies with the level of ethnic diversity – is completely different in a democracy as opposed
to a dictatorship. Moreover in our setup, the extent of appropriation is an endogenous
choice variable for the dictator. This allows us to document the relationship between ethnic
diversity and this level of appropriation by the dictator. The pattern is non-monotonic with
a potential discontinuous jump at the threshold where the switch in spending (from the
ethnic to the general public good) occurs. Our results provide a rationale — based on ethnic
diversity — for why one observes a different pattern and not just a different level of public
spending in dictatorships as opposed to democracies. Additionally, our findings suggest that
as a fairly ethnically homogeneous society starts becoming even more homogeneous, the
gap in the economic performance/growth when under a dictatorship and a when under a
democracy, starts shrinking. In other words, it is for ethnically diverse societies where the
formal institutional context matters more in terms of economic output/growth rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 provides a discussion
of the related literature. Section 3 develops the theory and derives the analytical results.
Section 4 discusses some possible extensions with respect to implications for economic per-
formance and also presents some welfare comparisons; Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper belongs to the literature focusing on the role of ethnic diversity in the allocation
and composition of public spending, and thereby on the implications for economic perfor-
mance. Importantly, the role of institutions such as democracy and dictatorship in shaping
both public spending and growth is also within the remit of our research. The link between
ethnic diversity and public goods provision draws upon the recognition of the fact that when
people are heterogeneous, so are their preferences, which thereby has an important bearing
on how much and what sort of public goods are produced.6
6For instance, the link between ethnic fractionalization and public services is attributed to taste differences
of different sections of the population (Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)) and/or inability
to impose social sanctions in ethnically diverse communities (Miguel and Gugerty (2005)), thus leading to
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Alesina et al. (1999) contends that when individuals have different preferences, they are less
interested in pooling resources for public projects. Also, representatives of interest groups
with an ethnic base are likely to value only the benefits of public goods that accrue to their
groups, and discount the benefits for other groups, which determine the composition of such
goods.7 Heterogeneity in preferences is a crucial ingredient of our paper, but all groups
value the general public good equally. The differences in taste is manifest with respect to
the ethnic good.
The role of ethnic diversity in determining economic performance, and how institutions shape
this is, has been the subject of several studies. Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ethnic
divisions negatively affect growth. The basic idea is that the difficulty for fractionalized
societies in finding common ground as regards the type and amount of public goods like
infrastructure that they would like their governments to provide, and the consequent reduc-
tion in levels of public goods provision, lowers growth.8 There is a literature that argues
that ethnic diversity could actually facilitate collective action and strategic coordination over
a range of political outcomes, which contrasts with the literature discussed above. Fearon
and Laitin (1996), using a social matching model, explain inter-ethnic cooperation along the
equilibrium path, which arises out of a fear of conflict between individuals spiralling to the
whole group. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that, once per capita income is controlled for,
more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience signif-
icant civil violence after the post-Cold War period.9 In our paper, the issue of cooperation
within/across ethnic groups does not arise since each individual in society decides on her
action unilaterally.
Collier (1998) and Bluedorn (2001) contend that more democratic institutions would per-
haps be more effective at managing inter-ethnic conflict that might arise in ethnically diverse
nations.10 Interestingly, Bluedorn’s result indicates that democracy is beneficial for growth
only in the most ethnically diverse nations; there may be some non-democracy benefit for
relatively ethnically homogeneous nations. It is worth noting that in our model, in a demo-
cratic set-up, greater ethnic heterogeneity increases the possibility of provision of the general
public good in equilibrium. This may lead to higher growth, which has some resonance with
failure of collective action. Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), in studying the Indian districts, have suggested
that more heterogeneous communities tend to be politically weaker, and therefore are likely to be denied the
public goods of their choice and are more likely to get some of the inferior substitutes.
7The idea is based on social identity theory following Tajfel et al. (1971), which says that intergroup
behaviour is characterised by individuals attributing positive utility to the wellbeing of members of their
own group and negative utility to that of members of other groups.
8See also Alesina and Drazen (1991), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Alesina et al. (1999), Baldwin and
Huber (2010) among others.
9The factors responsible for this are conditions (such as poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and
large populations) that favour insurgency, rather than the ethnic or religious characteristics of these countries.
10This view is challenged by some (for instance, Kaplan (2000), Zakaria (2003)), who argue that ushering
in democracy to low-income countries with high ethnic divisions could produce instability and chaos. See
also Tavares and Wacziarg (2001).
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the Bluedorn result. However, overall, our theoretical results on the implications of diversity
for growth are more in accordance with Fearon and Laitin (1996) rather than Easterly and
Levine (1997), although the mechanism we emphasize is different.
Morozumi and Veiga (2016) examines the role of institutions in the nexus between public
spending and economic growth. Their empirical results based on a dataset of 80 countries
over the 1970–2010 period suggest that particularly when institutions prompt governments
to be accountable to the general citizen does public capital spending promote growth. Padro-
i-Miquel (2007) argues how it is possible for rulers who often extract enormous rents and
grossly mismanage their economies to survive. This is possible in an environment where
society is ethnically divided and institutions are weak. Burgess et al. (2015) find, in the
context of Kenya during the 1963 – 2011 period, that those districts that shared the ethnicity
of the president received twice as much expenditure on roads and almost five times the length
of paved roads built relative to what would be predicted by their population share. This
form of ethnic favouritism, which was evident during periods of autocracy, disappeared
during periods of democracy in Kenya.
The above suggests that ethnicity of the ruler matters regarding the size and composition of
public spending when it comes to dictators. Interestingly, the evidence from India suggests
that something similar happens when rulers are popularly elected. Bardhan et al. (2008)
find that the village councils with a leader from the scheduled castes (SC) or scheduled
tribes (ST) tend to receive more credit from the Integrated Rural Development Programme
(IRDP). Besley et al. (2004) finds that for high spillover public goods (such as the access
road to a village), the residential proximity to the head of the Gram Panchayat matters. For
low spillover goods, the underlying preference of the head mainly counts.11 In our paper,
the dictator is only interested in increasing their rent from the national pie, and we have
abstracted away from any non-pecuniary payoffs (like favouring co-ethnics per se). When
it comes to democracy, our results are in a sense comparable to the papers cited here, but
this is due to political competition between parties rather than the ethnicity of the elected
representative.
On the subject of whether or not the nature of spending is monotonic in ethnic diversity, our
paper is close to Fernandez and Levy (2008).They show how diversity in preferences affects
the basic conflict between rich and poor in a framework where people are heterogeneous
both in preferences and in incomes, and in which political parties and party platforms are
endogenous.12 The government both redistributes income and funds special-interest projects
(e.g., local or group-specific public goods), all from proportional income taxation. Their
analysis demonstrates that the effect of increased diversity is non-monotonic.
11See also Munshi and Rosenzweig (2015) for an examination of the role of local ethnic politics in provision
of local public goods.
12See also Lizzeri and Persico (2005) for comparison of expenditure in terms of efficiency when the number
of competing candidates change. In a related vein, Mitra and Mitra (2016) examine the implications of more
competitive elections on redistributive outcomes like inequality and find a strong link.
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3 The Model
We develop a simple model to capture the effect of ethnic diversity on growth under different
political structures. We begin with the analysis of a democratic setup.
3.1 Democracy
Here we will assume that there are two (exogenously given) political parties, A and B who
compete for votes from the citizens. There is a unit mass of voters and for simplicity assume
that there is one dominant ethnic group with mass λ ∈ [1/2, 1).13 Hence, a lowering of (rise
in) λ would correspond to an increase (decrease) in ethnic diversity. The mass 1 − λ could
be composed of several different ethnic groups or just one ethnic group; it does not matter
in our setup.
There is a budget which may be spent on providing the citizens with public goods (or public
investment) which can potentially boost growth. Let the size of the budget be unity. Now,
the budget could be spent on two different public goods. One is a truly general public good
— call it G — investment in which benefits all citizens equally. The other is an ethnic-
specific good E, designed to benefit only members of the dominant ethnic group, i.e., the λ–
group.14 Hence, the budget constraint — for either of the two parties — is given by
λ.e+ g ≤ 1.
We will denote party j′s platform by (gj, ej) for j = A,B. The parties simultaneously
propose platforms, and each party seeks to maximize its expected number of votes given the
other party’s platform.
We assume that there is heterogeneity in preference for the ethnic-specific good E. The
payoffs to the voters are described below.
Take the case when e > 0. On being offered (g, e), the payoff to a member of the (1 − λ)–
group is simply g. On the other hand, the payoff to a member i of the λ– group is given by
ui(g, e;λ) = g + e+ i
where i is drawn from a distribution with cdf F independently for every i in the λ–group.
Also, E[] > 0 and f ≡ F ′ > 0 everywhere on the real line.15 Moreover, let f be symmetric
13One could think of this λ–group being composed of several smaller distinct ethnic groups, with some
overlap in taste for a common local public good. More on this later.
14This resonates to some degree with the setup of Foster and Rosenzweig (2001). They highlight the
differential preferences between the landed and the landless in the decision making process: while landowners
would typically favour expenditure on irrigation, there would be a shift toward (labour-intensive) road
construction projects as the landless participate more in decision-making.
15The linear payoff structure is not crucial, any w(g + e+ i) for w
′ > 0 suffices.
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and unimodal so that the mode is at E[]. This implies F (0) < 1
2
. This re-iterates the
fact that it is more likely for a member (of the dominant group) to actually have a positive
realization of , than not.
Observe that the ethnic-specific good E, with its element of taste-heterogeneity, easily lends
itself to the following interpretations. One could think of different scenarios where the dom-
inant ethnic group specializes (or has disproportionate shares) in a certain sector/industry.
Hence, increasing investment in E would by and large benefit most members of the group but
not all; some might actually be hurt if their fortunes are tied to other sectors/industries. Al-
ternatively, one could think of this λ– group as being composed of smaller ethnically distinct
sub–groups who are united in their common affinity for E. So the ethnic good E could be
veiwed as a kind of “compromise” local public good for this λ– group, where every member
of the λ– group has a positive expected return from consuming E, which is equal ex ante.16
In this setup, public investment in either good — G or E — is beneficial to the community
in aggregate terms. Clearly, G has the advantage of reaching out to all members of society
while the benefits from E are limited to (certain) members of the dominant ethnic group.
One can think of these investments in E and G as affecting total national output. Let output
be given by Y (g, λe) with Yg, Ye > 0 and Y (0, 0) = 0.
Now we are in a position to analyze the equilibrium of this simple game and then study its
dependence on ethnic diversity (as captured by λ). In fact, the following observation is a
step in that direction.
Observation 1. There exists a λ > 1/2, such that both parties proposing to spend the entire
budget on the public good G is the unique equilibrium for every λ ∈ [1/2, λ].
Proof. Start with (eA = eB = 0, gA = gB = 1). Here, each party gets an expected payoff of
1/2. Suppose party A deviates to e˜A > 0. This implies that A will definitely lose the votes
from the (1− λ)–group (since they get a payoff of 1 from party B and A cannot guarantee
them 1 if e˜A > 0). Hence, the optimal deviation for A involves e˜A = 1/λ.
Now, a voter i of the λ–group votes for A if
e˜A + i > gB.
Otherwise, voter i favours B and this happens with probability F (gB − e˜A) = F (1 − 1/λ).
In other words, he votes for A with probability 1− F ((λ− 1)/λ). Hence expected votes for
A is given by
V (λ) ≡ λ{1− F ((λ− 1)/λ)}.
16This aspect of an ethnic group having it’s own specific type of “local” public good is similar in spirit to
Fernandez and Levy (2008). In their model, however, each group is allowed one such good and the number
of groups is endogenous.
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Now, V (λ) < 1/2 for λ = 1/2 since f > 0 everywhere on the real line. This implies
that the deviation by A is unprofitable for λ = 1/2. By the continuity of V (.) in λ, this
implies the existence of some δ–neighborhood around λ = 1/2 such that V < 1/2 in that
δ–neighborhood. This gives a λ > 1/2 such that V (λ) < 1/2 for every λ ∈ [1/2, λ] making
(eA = eB = 0, gA = gB = 1) an equilibrium in that λ– interval.
For uniqueness, note the following. In any equilibrium, each party must have an expected
payoff of 1/2 otherwise ‘mimicry’ is always a profitable deviation. Any equilibrium apart
from (eA = eB = 0, gA = gB = 1) necessarily involves at least one party offering a positive
amount of E. The arguments above establish that any such platform must necessarily yield
a payoff lower than 1/2 when the other party proposes to spend the entire budget on G.
Thus, (eA = eB = 0, gA = gB = 1) is the only equilibrium in that λ– interval.
The intuition behind the result stated in Observation 1 is the following. When the dominant
ethnic group is only slightly larger than the rest (in particular, their size is close to 1/2) it is
not optimal from a party’s perspective to simply try to win their votes by providing only the
ethnic good; all the more so, since not everyone within the dominant ethnic group actually
likes the ethnic good. Moreover, with one party promising to spend the entire budget on
the general public good, any platform by the other party which spends less than the entire
budget on this general good will be rejected by all members of the minority. Therefore, both
parties spend the entire budget on the general public good so as to enlist the support of both
the ethnic groups.
This leads us to the question of what happens when the size of the dominant ethnic group
is beyond this threshold level of λ. In particular, is there any other equilibrium other than
(eA = eB = 0, gA = gB = 1) when we move beyond λ? The following observation sheds some
light on this matter.
Observation 2. There exists a λ > 1/2, such that both parties proposing to spend the entire
budget on the ethnic-specific good E is the unique equilibrium for every λ ∈ [λ, 1).
Proof. Start with (eA = eB = 1/λ, gA = gB = 0). Here, each party gets an expected payoff
of 1/2.
Suppose party A deviates to (g′A, e
′
A) > 0. This implies that A will definitely lose the votes
from the λ–group. To see why, note the following.
For any i in the λ–group, the payoff from B is 1/λ + i. From (g
′
A, e
′
A), the same voter’s
payoff is (1− g′A)/λ+ g′A + i. But
(1− g′A)/λ+ g′A + i = 1/λ+ g′A(1− 1/λ) + i < 1/λ+ i
since 1/2 ≤ λ < 1. Hence, (g′A, e′A) > 0 cannot be a profitable deviation for A for any
λ ∈ [1/2, 1).
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Now suppose A deviates to g′A = 1. Recall V (λ) ≡ λ{1 − F ((λ − 1)/λ)} from Observation
1. Note that V (λ) here is the payoff to B when A proposes g′A = 1 and B proposes (eB =
1/λ, gB = 0) for any given λ. Hence, V (λ) ≥ 1/2 implies that A′s deviation is not profitable.
Now, V (λ) > 1/2 for λ = 1 since we have F (0) < 1/2. By the continuity of V (.) in λ,
this implies the existence of some δ′–neighborhood around λ = 1 such that V > 1/2 in that
δ′–neighborhood. This gives a λ > 1/2 such that V (λ) > 1/2 for every λ ∈ [λ, 1) making
(eA = eB = 1/λ, gA = gB = 0) an equilibrium in that λ– interval.
For uniqueness, note the following. Any equilibrium apart from (eA = eB = 1/λ, gA = gB =
0) necessarily involves at least one party offering a positive amount of G. The arguments
above establish that any such platform must necessarily yield a payoff lower than 1/2 when
the other party proposes to spend the entire budget on E. Thus, (eA = eB = 1/λ, gA = gB =
0) is the only equilibrium in that λ– interval.
The intuition behind the result stated in Observation 2 is the following. When the dominant
ethnic group is truly large in size — in particular, say close to unity — then for a political
party to ensure an electoral victory getting their support is enough. So the ethnic minority
can be neglected as long as their size is sufficiently small. Given that a dominant proportion
of the majority ethnic group actually likes the ethnic good (recall, F (0) < 1
2
), it becomes
optimal for a party to just spend the entire budget on the ethnic good.
So far we have established that there are intervals [1/2, λ] and [λ, 1) where the equilibrium is
unique though different in each of the two intervals. Moreover, it must be that λ ≤ λ. This
raises the following questions: Are λ, λ actually distinct? If yes, then what are the equilibria
for any λ ∈ (λ, λ)?
It turns out that there is a unique value of λ — call it λˆ — such that (eA = eB = 0, gA =
gB = 1) is the unique equilibrium for all λ < λˆ and (eA = eB = 0, gA = gB = 1) is the unique
equilibrium for all λ > λˆ. This is stated more formally in the following observation.
Observation 3. There exists a unique λˆ ∈ (1/2, 1), such that V (λ) ≡ λ{1−F ((λ− 1)/λ)}
is lower (higher) than 1/2 for λ < (>)λˆ and V (λˆ) = 1/2.
Proof. By inspection it is clear that the derivative of V (λ) w.r.t. λ — call it Vλ — is of
ambiguous sign. As noted earlier, V (λ) < 1/2 for λ = 1/2 and V (λ) > 1/2 for λ = 1. Hence,
by the continuity of V in λ, there exists λ ∈ [1/2, 1) such that V (λ) = 1/2. Let λˆ be such a
λ. We will argue that there can only be one such λˆ.
Observe the following equation:
λ{1− F ((λ− 1)/λ)} = 1/2.
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Let x ≡ 1/λ. So, x ∈ (1, 2]. Hence, the above equation can be written as
x+ 2F (1− x) = 2.
If we can show that the solution to the above equation is unique, we are done. Define
y(x) ≡ x+ 2F (1− x). Note that
δy
δx
= 1− 2f(1− x).
Also,
δ2y
δx2
= 2f ′(1− x).
Given that x > 1 and f ′(z) > 0 whenever z < 0 (by the unimodality and symmetry of f
around µ), this implies
δ2y
δx2
> 0. Hence, δy
δx
is increasing in x for x > 1.
Note that y(2) > 2 > y(1). Hence, δy
δx
must be positive for some x ∈ (1, 2]. Combining this
with the fact that δy
δx
is increasing in x for x > 1, we get that there is a unique x (and hence
a unique λ = 1/x) where y(x) = 2. This completes the proof.
Observation 3 pins down the unique threshold λˆ. Note, it depends only upon the distribution
F . Using the equation defining λˆ, we can ask how changes to this distribution affects the
position of λˆ on the interval [1/2, 1). In particular, it is clear from inspection that a rightward
shift of the density function f will lead to a lower λˆ. So any shift of the distribution F in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance will result in a lower value of this threshold λˆ.
Intuitively, a smaller possibility of negative realizations of the  shock and hence a higher
value for E[] (which by assumption exceeds 0) implies that the dominant group’s support
may be sufficient for victory (by spending solely on the ethnic good) even for smaller values
of λ.
Before proceeding any further, it may be of interest to know the nature of equilibrium
platforms at λ = λˆ. It turns out (as noted in the following observation) that there are four
equilibria in pure strategies for λ = λˆ. This multiplicity arises precisely from the fact that
V (λˆ) = 1/2.
Observation 4. There exist four equilibria in pure strategies and a family of mixed strategy
equilibria for λ = λˆ. Moreover, the provision of G is either 0 or 1 depending upon which
equilibrium is played out.
Proof. Both parties offering g = 1 is an equilibrium. The best possible unilateral deviation
is e = 1/λˆ which yields a payoff of 1/2 given that V (λˆ) = 1/2. Both parties offering e = 1/λˆ
is also an equilibrium. The best possible unilateral deviation is g = 1 which yields a payoff
of 1/2 given that V (λˆ) = 1/2. Also, (eA = 1/λˆ, gB = 1) and (gA = 1, eB = 1/λˆ) are
also equilibria platforms arising from the fact that V (λˆ) = 1/2. Finally, each party mixing
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between g = 1 and e = 1/λˆ with any positive probability on one of the pure strategies will
constitute an equilibrium. This completes the proof.
The observations above, taken together, give us the following result.
Proposition 1. In a democracy, the relationship between ethnic diversity (as captured by
the magnitude of λ) and the share of the pure public good G (or alternatively, the ethnic-
specific public good E) provided in equilibrium is (weakly) monotonic in λ. In particular,
there is unique value of λ — namely, λˆ — such that for all λ < λˆ the unique equilibrium
allocation involves spending the entire budget on G, and for all λ > λˆ the unique equilibrium
allocation involves spending the entire budget on the ethnic-specific public good E. For λ = λˆ,
the equilibrium provision of G is either 0 or 1.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Observations 1 — 4.
Next we move on to a similar analysis when instead of a two–party electoral democracy, we
have a dictatorship in place.
3.2 Dictatorship
In a dictatorship, there will be no explicit role for any political parties. The decision regarding
the allocation of budgetary funds for investment into G and E will be taken by the dictator,
whom we shall refer to as D.
The other elements of the model remain just as before. We will have our dominant ethnic
group of size λ and it will be assumed that the citizens have no direct control over the
budget (just as before). In a democratic setup, the allocations proposed by the two parties
were governed by considerations of support by the citizens through the ballot. Here, under
a dictatorial regime, certain different considerations will impel the dictator D to allocate
spending in a particular way. We will return to these considerations shortly.
There are some basic considerations which any dictator must take into account. First, there
is always a threat of a mass revolution. Hence, our dictator D knows that with some chance
he will not be ruling the roost in the near future. Secondly, staying in power is valuable to
D; this provides access to “rents” which depend on the public budget.17 For simplicity, we
will assume the following: D lives for one period during which there is a chance of a mass
revolution and if he survives the revolution (or if there is none) then he can usurp a part of
the public budget. In case D is overthrown, he gets a zero payoff.
Now this brings us to the question of what determines the incidence and success of a “rev-
olution”. We posit a simple two–stage game to capture the idea of a “revolution”. In the
17More on these “rents” later.
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D proposes (eD , gD)                 Citizen draws ϵ            Citizen chooses from {R, NR}     
1-p 
Democracy: Parties A,B 
D implements (eD , gD) 
p 
Figure 1: Timing. The sequence of moves under dictatorship.
first stage, the dictator proposes an allocation (gD, eD) ≥ (0, 0) and also his “share” µ of the
budget.18 The allocation (gD, eD) is subject to feasibility constraints. Therefore,
gD + λeD ≤ 1− µ.
In the second stage, the members of the two different ethnic groups simultaneously decide
whether or not to revolt against D. Formally, each citizen chooses an action from the set
{R,NR} where R denotes revolt and NR not revolt. This action is taken individually by
each citizen — hence, no coordination issues — and is done after each λ–group citizen draws
her realization of  which is the stochastic component of the payoff from E. This means that
the choice of revolting or not is made after she knows her exact valuation of the E–good.
What happens when the revolt is “successful” and D is deposed? We take the position that
a two-party democracy emerges at the conclusion of a successful rebellion. The idea is that
the political parties can be thought to remain dormant under a dictatorship, but emerge
once the dictator loses power. In reality, in countries which move back-and-forth between
democracy and (military) dictatorships, prominent political parties are quite resilient and
resume activities soon after the dictator is deposed (see e.g., the political histories of Pakistan
and Zimbabwe among others).
At the end of the period, exactly one of the two things happen:
(i) all citizens choose NR or some choose R but the revolt is unsuccessful and D implements
his proposed (gD, eD) and usurps µ.
(ii) The revolt results in D’s removal and democracy is restored. Under democracy, we have
the citizens voting and deciding the allocation of the budget via the ballot.
See Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the timing.
Let p denote the probability of a successful revolution. How does p depend on the parameters
18Since the citizens know the size of the budget, announcing (gD, eD) is sufficient for the citizens to infer
µ.
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of the model? We assume that larger the size of the rebel group λ, the higher is p. For the
sake of concreteness, let p equal the mass of people who choose action NR. As a tie–
breaking rule, we have that whenever a citizen is indifferent between D′s offer and the
alternative equilibrium allocation under democracy, she chooses NR. This is easily justified
by assuming there is a fixed cost c ≥ 0 which is incurred by the citizen in case she chooses
to rebel. In fact, we could explicitly incorporate this (private) cost of revolution c > 0 into
our model. However, we refrain from doing so as it complicates notation without adding any
further insights; all our qualitative results are unchanged as long as c is sufficiently low.19
In principle, D can set µ equal to unity. That implies (gD, eD) = (0, 0). In a dynamic
setting, this would never transpire in equilibrium as Y (0, 0) = 0. This implies that the
budget available for the subsequent period — which depends on this period’s Y — will be
0. Hence, any D with a sufficiently high discount factor will not set µ = 1. On a realistic
note, one can imagine that in such a scenario there would be hue and cry internationally,
there would be a humanitarian crises as a result of which D might be removed from office.
Therefore, we set an upper bound on µ — call it µ — which is below unity. So any µ > µ
results in the dictator’s immediate removal (i.e., p = 1 for µ > µ). Of course, µ can be
arbitrarily close to 1.20
We solve this two–stage game backwards, as is standard practice. D′s problem in the first
stage is the following: D chooses (gD, eD, µ) ≥ (0, 0, 0) to maximize
p.0 + (1− p)µ
subject to the budget constraint
gD + eDλ ≤ 1− µ.
Note, µ ∈ [0, µ]. The optimal choice of (gD, eD, µ) clearly depends upon the degree of ethnic
diversity λ.
Take any given λ ∈ [1/2, 1). Recall the cutoff value of λ, namely λˆ, from the democratic
setup. What the citizens can expect to transpire in democracy will depend on where λ stands
in relation to λˆ (see Proposition 1).
We start with λ < λˆ.
Case 1: λ < λˆ.
Take a voter from the minority group, i.e. from the (1 − λ)– group. If D is removed (and
19Acemoglu et al. (2010) study how non-democratic regimes use the military (which consists of a set of
individuals who act in their own self-interest), and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships
(when the military decide that turning against, rather than aligning with, the elite would enable them to
pursue their own objectives). We abstract from such dynamic considerations and focus on public goods
provision under alternative regimes.
20This threshold µ will never bind in equilibrium. More on this later.
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Figure 2: Payoffs to citizens. The possible payoffs to each group of citizens under dictatorship
depending upon the success/failure of the revolution for λ < λˆ.
voting takes place under democracy), he gets a payoff of 1 since the entire budget is spent
on G for λ < λˆ (see Proposition 1). On the other hand, if D stays in power, then he gets a
payoff of gD. Hence, a member of the minority group will choose R whenever gD < 1. So to
prevent the (1−λ)– group from rebelling, D must choose µ = 0 and get a payoff of 0. As we
show below, this is not optimal for D. In fact, D will choose µ > 0 and all of the (1 − λ)–
group will choose R.
Now take a citizen i from the λ–group. If D is removed, he gets a payoff of 1. On the other
hand, if D stays in power, then he gets a payoff of gD + eD + i, if eD > 0; otherwise he gets
gD. So this citizen i will choose R only if one of the following is true: eD = 0 and gD < 1 or
gD + eD + i < 1. Like in the case of the (1− λ)– group, setting gD = 1 prevents revolution.
In fact, all citizens choose NR. However, this also guarantees µ = 0 and hence a payoff of 0
for D. As argued below, D will choose µ > 0 and set eD > 0.
See Figure 2 for a tabular representation of the citizens’ payoffs in this scenario.
The corresponding expression for p (for eD > 0) is given by
p = 1− λ+ λ[Prob.(gD + eD + i < 1)] = 1− λ+ λF (1− gD − eD).
Hence, D’s problem can be written as:
maxgD,eD,µ∈[0,µ][1− F (1− gD − eD)]µλ
subject to
gD + eDλ ≤ 1− µ
gD, eD ≥ 0.
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Given that the budget constraint is binding, the problem becomes:
maxgD,eD [1− F (1− gD − eD)](1− gD − λeD)
subject to
gD, eD ≥ 0.
Setting up the standard Lagrangean FOCs makes it clear that gD = 0 and eD > 0.
Note, FOC(eD): (1− λeD)f(1− eD) = λ[1− F (1− eD)]
Before proceeding any further, we introduce some mild restrictions on the distribution func-
tion of , namely, F .
Assumption A1: f(x)
1−F (x) is (weakly) increasing in x.
Assumption A2: f(x) ≥ f ′(x) ∀x < 0.
Assumption A3: f(0) ≤ 1.
Assumption A4: f ′(1) ≥ 0.
These assumptions essentially require that the spread of  is relatively “smooth” in the
sense that there is non-negligible mass in the range away from 0. Moreover, most standard
distribution functions (e.g. logistic distribution) satisfy them.21
A1 guarantees that there is a unique solution to the FOC w.r.t. eD. Call it e
∗
D. Moreover
by A4, we also have that the second-order condition w.r.t. eD is negative at eD = e
∗
D. Thus,
we have that e∗D is a maxima. Note, D
′s payoff from offering e∗D dominates that from setting
eD =
1−µ
λ
. Recall, D′s objective function is [1−F (1− eD)](1− λeD) which is non–montonic
in eD.
22 Coupled with the fact that there is a unique turning point in the support of eD, i.e.,
at e∗D, it establishes that D
′s payoff is maximized at e∗D and not at eD =
1−µ
λ
.
We also have
∂e∗D
∂λ
< 0 which means that were D to remain in power (no revolution or an
unsuccessful one) then greater the diversity the higher the public investments; in other words,
lower the amount pilfered by the dictator (since
∂e∗D
∂λ
< 0 immediately implies ∂µ
∂λ
> 0). This
is more formally stated in the following observation.
Observation 5. For λ < λˆ, the dictator D will offer to provide a positive of amount of
only E. Moreover,
∂e∗D
∂λ
< 0.
Proof. The first part, i.e., e∗D > 0 and gD = 0 follows immediately from the standard
Lagrangean FOCs. To see why the second part holds, recall assumption A1 and note that
21To take a specific example, consider the general logistic distribution F (.) of the variable X where
X = a+ bZ and Z follows the standard logistic distribution. All a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1 satisfy A1–A4.
22Recall, gD is optimally set to 0.
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the FOC w.r.t. eD can be written as:
f(1− eD)
1− F (1− eD) =
λ
1− λeD .
By A1, the LHS of the above is (weakly) decreasing in eD.
Now suppose
∂e∗D
∂λ
> 0. Consider an increase in λ. This immediately implies that the RHS
increases. But if
∂e∗D
∂λ
> 0, then the LHS must decrease by A1. Therefore,
∂e∗D
∂λ
≤ 0.
Now suppose
∂e∗D
∂λ
= 0. Consider an increase in λ. Again, the RHS decreases. Now the LHS
is unchanged leading to a contradiction.
Hence,
∂e∗D
∂λ
< 0 is the only possibility.
The intuition behind the result in Observation 5 can be found from noting the following.
When diversity is relatively high (λ is lower than the threshold λˆ), then a transition to
democracy results in the provision of only the G good; the entire budget is spent on it. This
clearly is the best possible situation for the minority (the (1 − λ) group). Hence, they will
always revolt for λ < λˆ. Among the majority (the λ group), not everyone would revolt as long
as a positive amount of E and/or G is provided given the heterogeneity in the preference for
E. Moreover, providing E is “cheaper” as it can be more precisely targeted at the majority
(the λ group). As the size of this λ group increases (a reduction in diversity), the threat from
the minority becomes less important and hence the dictator can economize on the provision
of E; this explains the negative sign of
∂e∗D
∂λ
.
We turn to the next scenario.
Case 2: λ > λˆ.
Take a voter from the minority group, i.e. from the (1 − λ)– group. If D is removed (and
voting takes place under democracy), he gets a payoff of 0 since the entire budget is spent
on E for λ > λˆ (see Proposition 1). On the other hand, if D stays in power, then he gets a
payoff of gD. Hence, a member of the minority group will always choose NR since gD ≥ 0.
Now take a citizen i from the λ–group. If D is removed, he gets a payoff of 1/λ+ i. On the
other hand, if D stays in power, then he gets a payoff of gD + eD + i, if eD > 0; otherwise
he gets gD. Note, this citizen i will definitely choose R if eD > 0 since 1/λ > gD + eD (this
follows from gD + eDλ ≤ 1− µ and µ ≥ 0). However, if eD = 0 and gD > 0 then this citizen
chooses R only if 1/λ+ i > gD.
See Figure 3 for a tabular representation of the citizens’ payoffs in this scenario.
We claim that D will always offer only G in this scenario.
Observation 6. For λ > λˆ, the dictator D will offer to provide a positive of amount of
only G, i.e., e∗D = 0 and g
∗
D > 0.
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Figure 3: Payoffs to citizens. The possible payoffs to each group of citizens under dictatorship
depending upon the success/failure of the revolution for λ > λˆ.
Proof. Suppose D chooses to offer a positive amount of E. The members of the minority
group will not revolt. But all the members of the λ–group will revolt (since 1/λ > gD + eD).
This implies that the probability that D is removed is p = λ. Hence, D′s objective function
is (1− λ)µ. So D will choose to steal the maximum amount permissible, i.e., µ.
However, D can improve on this by setting gD = (1 − µ) and eD = 0. This guarantees D
a payoff of µ when the revolt fails. Moreover, the success probability of the revolt is now
strictly below λ since some members of the λ–group (who have 1/λ+i < (1−µ)) will choose
NR.
Hence, D will set e∗D = 0 and g
∗
D > 0.
In light of Observation 6, we can express the revolt success probability as
p = λ[Prob.(1/λ+ i > gD)] = λ[1− F (gD − (1/λ))].
Hence, D’s problem can be written as:
maxgD≥1−µ,µ∈[0,µ]{1− λ[1− F (gD − (1/λ))]}µ
subject to
gD ≤ 1− µ.
Note, the budget constraint will bind and hence the optimization problem can be written
simply in terms of µ. Hence, D chooses µ ∈ [0, µ] to maximise the following:
{1− λ[1− F (1− µ− (1/λ))]}µ
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The FOC w.r.t. µ is given by:
1− λ[1− F (1− µ− (1/λ))] = µλf(1− µ− (1/λ)).
Observe the FOC w.r.t. µ. It is clear from inspection that the LHS is positive for µ = 0
whereas the RHS is 0; in other words, the LHS exceeds the RHS at µ = 0. Moreover, the
LHS is decreasing in µ. Assumption A2 implies that the RHS is increasing in µ. Thus, a
unique intersection is guaranteed giving us an unique solution to the FOC condition. Call
this solution µ∗.
Additionally, the very same assumption A2 guarantees that the second–order condition for
a maxima is satisfied.23 Note, D′s payoff from offering g∗D ≡ (1 − µ∗) dominates that from
setting gD = 1 − µ. This is so since D′s objective function is non–montonic in µ with only
one single turning point in the support of µ, i.e., at µ = µ∗.
Now we ask the question: how does the provision of G change as we change ethnic diversity,
as captured by λ? Will he choose to appropriate more or less as λ changes? In other words,
what is the sign of ∂µ
∗
∂λ
?
The following observation provides the answer.
Observation 7. For λ > λˆ, the dictator D will offer higher and higher amounts of G as
ethnic diversity falls (i.e., λ increases). In other words, we have ∂µ
∗
∂λ
< 0.
Proof. The solution µ∗ to the FOC by definition satisfies the following
1− F (1− µ∗ − (1/λ)) + µ∗f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ)) = 1/λ.
Now, this must hold for every λ > λˆ. Therefore, the total derivative of the LHS w.r.t λ
should equal that of the RHS for every λ > λˆ.
Note, the derivative of the RHS w.r.t λ is simply −1/λ2. Differentiating the LHS w.r.t. λ
yields
f(1−µ∗−(1/λ))
(
∂µ∗
∂λ
− 1
λ2
)
+
∂µ∗
∂λ
[
f(1−µ∗−(1/λ))−µ∗f ′(1−µ∗−(1/λ))
]
+
µ∗
λ2
f ′(1−µ∗−(1/λ))
which after re-arranging terms can be written as(
∂µ∗
∂λ
− 1
λ2
)[
f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ))− µ∗f ′(1− µ∗ − (1/λ))
]
+
∂µ∗
∂λ
.f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ)).
23Some differentiation yields that
SOC(µ) : −λ[2f(1− µ− (1/λ))− µf ′(1− µ− (1/λ))]
which is negative under assumption A2.
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Call this expression τ(λ). So τ(λ) = −1/λ2 for every λ > λˆ.
Note (1 − µ∗ − (1/λ)) < 0 (since µ∗ ≥ 0 and λ < 1). Also, f ′(x) > 0 for all x ≤ 0. Under
assumption A3 this leads to 0 < f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ)) < 1.
Suppose ∂µ
∗
∂λ
> 0.
If in fact, ∂µ
∗
∂λ
≥ 1/λ2, then τ(λ) > 0 leading us immediately to a contradiction.
So consider ∂µ
∗
∂λ
∈ (0, 1/λ2). Note, in this case
τ(λ) >
(
∂µ∗
∂λ
− 1
λ2
)[
f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ))
]
+
∂µ∗
∂λ
.f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ))
>
(
∂µ∗
∂λ
− 1
λ2
)[
f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ))
]
>
(
− 1
λ2
)[
f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ))
]
> − 1
λ2
where the last inequality follows from 0 < f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ)) < 1. Hence, it cannot be that
∂µ∗
∂λ
> 0.
Suppose ∂µ
∗
∂λ
= 0. Then
τ(λ) =
(
− 1
λ2
)[
f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ))− µ∗f ′(1− µ∗ − (1/λ))
]
>
(
− 1
λ2
)[
f(1− µ∗ − (1/λ))
]
> − 1
λ2
.
Hence, contradiction. This implies ∂µ
∗
∂λ
< 0 which establishes the claim.
The intuition behind the result in Observations 6 and 7 can be found from noting the
following. When diversity is relatively low (λ is higher than the threshold λˆ), then a transition
to democracy results in the provision of only the E good; the entire budget is spent on it.
This clearly is the worst possible situation for the minority (the (1 − λ) group) as they do
not value the E good at all. Hence, they will never revolt for λ > λˆ. Among the majority
(the λ group), provision of a positive amount of E by the dictator would invoke revolution
en masse as long as the dictator steals (sets µ > 0). So the dictator provides no E and a
positive amount of G. This way not everyone in the majority group would revolt owing to
the heterogeneity in the preference for E. As the size of this λ group increases (a reduction
in diversity), the threat from the majority becomes more important and hence the dictator
increases the provision of G (which is synonymous with reducing µ∗); this explains the
negative sign of ∂µ
∗
∂λ
.
Finally, we turn to the remaining possibility.
Case 3: λ = λˆ.
Before proceeding to the analysis for dictatorship in this case, it will be useful to recall the
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equilibrium outcome under democracy. Observation 4 informs us about the multiplicity of
equlibria and that the equilibrium provision could range from g = 1 and e = 0 to g = 0 and
e = 1/λ. So the analysis here necessarily involves imposing some structure on the beliefs of
the players as to what outcome will result in democracy given the infinite number of possible
equilibria. Although, this would be an interesting exercise per se, we abstain from a complete
treatment here and just analyze two possible belief structures by the players.
First, suppose that the citizens and the dictator believe that in case of a two–party compe-
tition (under λ = λˆ), both parties will actually offer g = 1. The other belief structure that
we will deal with is the polar opposite — namely, that the citizens and the dictator believe
that (in the same scenario) both parties will actually offer to spend the entire budget on E.24
Note, when we impose the belief (on the players) that the entire budget would be spent on
G, the case boils down to the scenario of λ < λˆ (Case 1 above). On the other hand, when
we impose the belief that the entire budget would be spent on E, the case reduces to the
scenario of λ > λˆ (Case 2 above). In either case, we know what happens in equilibrium.
This brings us to the issue of discontinuity (of several variables) at λ = λˆ. First, there is
a switch from spending solely on E to spending solely on G as we pass this λˆ threshold.
Secondly, one may wonder about the amount of expropriation by the dictator, namely, the
fraction µ∗. How does that change around λ = λˆ?
It turns out that the answer to this question is not straightforward. In particular, it is not
possible to say if µ∗ is continuous in λ at λ = λˆ. It would depend upon the distribution F .
Specifically, on where the mean of the distribution is, by how much it exceeds 0. 25
However, the issue of the discontinuity does not cloud the main insights from the dictatorship
analysis. This concerns the sharp change in the pattern of public investment in the G and
E goods as one passes the λˆ threshold and also how the pattern varies within the (1/2, λˆ)
interval and also within the (λˆ, 1) interval. We record this in Figure 4.26
The above discussion can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In a dictatorship, the relationship between ethnic diversity (as captured by
the magnitude of λ) and the share of the pure public good G offered by the dictator is (weakly)
monotonic in λ. Specifically, the unique equilibrium allocation involves the dictator offering
only E for λ < λˆ. For all λ > λˆ, only G is offered in equilibrium. Moreover, the dictator
offers more and more of G as λ increases beyond λˆ.
24Clearly, one could perform a more general analysis where all concerned players assume some probability
distribution over the possible equilibrium outcomes. While certainly interesting, we believe that it would
add little to the main arguments in this paper.
25This is clear from comparing the first–order conditions written in terms of µ for Cases 1 and 2. We omit
the details of the calculations for the sake of brevity.
26In the figure, we have depicted the discontinuity at λ = λˆ; specifically, we have shown that µ falls
immediately on crossing λˆ. Of course, this need not necessarily be the case. µ could also rise but we have
settled on this depiction just for ease of exposition.
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Figure 4: Appropriation under Dictatorship. The amount spent on G and E under dictator-
ship (1− µ) for different levels of ethnic diversity (λ) is recorded on the vertical axis. Note
the change in slope near the threshold λˆ.
We would like to draw attention to the proposition above and contrast it with our main result
for the case of the democratic setup. Recall that in our democratic setup (with the standard
two–party competition framework), we obtained that for a highly (ethnically) homogeneous
society, the entire budget will be spent on providing E.27 On the other hand, we find that
for a dictatorship a highly (ethnically) homogeneous society will see a provision of only the
G good. Moreover, the provision of G is higher, ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of
homogeneity. What is striking is the reversal in the pattern of spending under a dictatorship
as compared to that in a democracy.
Figure 4 reveals an non-monotonic relationship between the extent of appropriation by the
dictator (captured by µ∗) and the degree of ethnic diversity (proxied by λ). Using this figure,
one can attempt to pinpoint the level of ethnic diversity where the extent of appropriation
is the highest.
If there was no “jump” at λ = λˆ, one would immediately conclude that λˆ is the level of
ethnic diversity where the dictator usurps the most. In face of the (potential) discontinuity,
what can one say? It turns out that the monotonic relation between µ∗ and λ both to the left
and right of λˆ (consult Observations 5 and 7) tells us that no matter whether the function
1− µ∗ jumps up or down at the discontinuity (λˆ) the maximum µ∗ is reached “close” to λˆ.
Overall, this suggests that the maximum the dictator extracts in equilibrium occurs close to
the point where the switch in the type of public spending happens.
27Interestingly, the more homogeneous the society in terms of preference for E (as captured by the mag-
nitude of λ), the higher the chance that the allocation of the budget is inefficient. This is partly driven by
the fact that political parties need compete only for the votes of the ethnic majority as long as the latter are
of sufficient numerical strength.
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4 Some Extensions
Here we discuss some implications of our theory by extending our model in certain directions.
4.1 Public Spending and Growth
The nature of public spending in an economy has the capacity to affect economic performance
and in particular, output growth.
One can think of overall output Y being a standard CES function — involving g, λ and e
— of the following form:
Y (g, λe) = χ[αgρ + (1− α)(λe)ρ]1/ρ
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (1
2
, 1). We take the position that growth is mainly driven by
investment in general public goods rather than in (ethnically) targeted goods. This is behind
the assumption on α being in the interval (1
2
, 1). This guarantees that when the entire budget
is being spent on either G or E, spending it on G yields a higher output. In other words,
Y (1, 0) > Y (0, 1). 28 In this restricted sense, we have that investment in the general public
good outperforms investment in the ethnic–specific good in terms of overall output.
χ is the TFP term which we assume satisfies the following condition: χ ≥ 1
(1−α)
1
ρ
.
Hence, it is possible to generate an output level of 1, when all the budget is spent on E.29
We can now use our model to ask if the relationship between ethnicity and growth is at all
governed by the existing political regime. As Propositions 1 and 2 clearly state, the variation
in the pattern of expenditure (between G and E) over the level of ethnic diversity (proxied
by λ) is completely different under the two political regimes. From this perspective, our
model delivers that as ethnic diversity increases in a democracy (crossing the λˆ threshold
from the right) there is an increase in output. However, under a dictatorship we have that
any increase in ethnic diversity (in the interval to the right of λˆ) leads to a fall in output.
Note however, to the left of the λˆ threshold we have that any increase in ethnic diversity
has no effect in a democracy while it leads to an increase in output under dictatorship; this
suggests a convergence in output levels across the two institutional regimes for high levels
of ethnic diversity. So, one should observe a divergence in output levels across regimes for
greater ethnic diversity up to a point (the λˆ threshold), beyond which increases in ethnic
diversity leads to a convergence in output levels across these two institutional regimes.
The above discussion is perhaps a pointer that one ought to turn to empirical analysis to
28Note, Y (1, 0) = χα1/ρ and Y (0, 1) = χ(1− α)1/ρ. Hence, Y (1,0)Y (0,1) = ( α1−α )1/ρ > 1 since α > 12 .
29This automatically guarantees that it is possible to get an even higher output by spending all the budget
on the G good.
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really tease out the quantitative differences in this regard. Insofar we treat these output levels
in our static framework as some steady state levels in a dynamic setting, our predictions can
be interpreted in terms of output growth rather than levels.
4.2 Public spending and Welfare
The issue of citizen payoffs from public spending is directly present in our model. This makes
it possible to analyze the welfare accruing to each ethnic group and overall under each of
the two regimes, for varying levels of ethnic diversity. Of course, we are only capturing the
welfare which follows directly from the utilization of the public spending; the indirect effects
which potentially arise due to a higher/lower output do not enter the current analysis.
First, consider the welfare under democracy. For the dominant ethnic group, under democ-
racy there is always a positive level ex ante regardless of the degree of diversity.
Start with λ < λˆ. Here both the ethnic groups have the same welfare since the entire budget
is spent on G. So,
Uλ = U1−λ = 1.
Next consider λ > λˆ. Here only the dominant ethnic group enjoys a non-zero payoff since
only the E good is provided. So the welfare to the dominant group as a whole is given by:
Uλ =
∫ (
1
λ
+ i
)
dF =
1
λ
+ E[] > 1
where the last inequality follows from noting that λ < 1 and E[] > 0. Clearly, for the ethnic
minority the welfare in this scenario is 0.
Notice, overall welfare (in the sense of population-weighted average of the welfare of the
different ethnic groups) is higher when ethnic diversity is low (λ > λˆ). This is driven by
E[] > 0. Why? Suppose that E[] ≤ 0; then, Uλ ≤ 1λ . Therefore, the total welfare is
λ.Uλ + (1− λ).0 ≤ λ.1
λ
= 1.
Thus, the expected payoff to a member of the dominant group from the ethnic good being
positive leads to greater welfare overall. In terms of the distribution of the welfare, clearly
there is more inequality as compared to the case of λ < λˆ.
Now we turn to the dictatorship regime. For λ < λˆ, only the E good is provided. But
notice µ∗ > 0 and hence it is possible that Uλ < 1 (compare with the corresponding scenario
under democracy).30 Moreover, the level of welfare is increasing in diversity (follows from
30It is not possible to provide a sharper comparison without assuming some specific functional form for
the distribution F . This is required in order to solve for µ∗ explicitly.
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Observation 5).
For the λ > λˆ case, we have only the G good being provided. Once again µ∗ > 0 and hence
overall welfare is clearly below 1 (compare with the corresponding scenario under democracy).
Moreover, the level of welfare is decreasing in diversity (follows from Observation 7). Notice,
the minority group is better off here than under democracy.
5 Conclusion
Given the inherent differences between democracy and dictatorship, it is natural to hypoth-
esize that the political regime would have an impact on both the level and the pattern
of public spending for any fixed level of ethnic diversity. Here we explore — by means
of a tractable model — how political institutions condition the relationship between eth-
nic diversity and public spending. This would have implications for economic performance
(particularly, growth) under these regimes for various levels of ethnic diversity.
In principle it would be interesting to empirically assess the validity of the mechanism out-
lined here. But this necessarily involves collating data on public goods provision/expenditure
across countries over time and more importantly classifying them into groups “general pub-
lic goods” and “ethnic public goods”. This classification is not without ambiguity as what
may seem to be a public good may well be cornered by certain dominant ethnic groups. To
take an example, provision of a public school for a village might appear to be for the benefit
of all villagers; but it may happen that certain social groups are excluded from attending
school because of historical prejudices (say, Scheduled Castes/Tribes in India). Thus, there
are many challenges to attempting a proper empirical test of our theory, which we hope can
be addressed in future research.
The importance of ethnicity, democracy and public spending from a policy perspective is
undeniably considerable. Given that this paper attempts to provide a simple (yet non-
trivial) theoretical framework which can address the inter-linkages among these variables,
the findings of this paper seem particularly relevant.
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